ferent topic that has garnered significantly less attention from social theorists, though one that is of central importance to his work. I will consider Adorno's ideaofmimesis,aconceptthatremainssomewhatunderdevelopedinhiswork butisneverthelesscrucialtounderstandinghissocialtheoryandisrelevanttoany assessmentofhisabilitytoprovideanactualsocial-theoretical(ratherthanstrictly philosophical)explanationofthepathologiesandchallengesofmodernity.For Adorno,ourpresentlifeisoneofestrangement-weareestrangedfromourselves, fromfellowhumanbeings,andfromnature.Mimesis,understoodasthe'assimilationoftheselftotheother',representsboththelong-lostidealofautonomy thatanimatesmuchofhisworkandthecrucialnormativestandpointfromwhich hecritiquesmodernsocieties. 4 Itisthefulcrumofhisthought.Nevertheless,it receiveslittlesustainedtreatmentinhiswritings,insteadbeingpresentedthrough allusionstowhatitisnot.Exploringthisconceptwillprovideabetterappraisal of how both first-generation critical theory and, more generally, aestheticized modelsofsocialtheoryintheAdornianmold,continuetofallshortofoutlining justwhatautonomyis.
This essay proceeds in several steps. First, I briefly outline Adorno and Horkheimer'scritiqueofmodernityandinstrumentalrationality.Byunderstandingtheproblemsofmodernityastheyseeit,wecanbegintoidentifywhatan alternativeshouldlooklike,andalsohowtheyviewthestatusofcritiqueinlight ofthetotalizingaspectsofmodernity.ThenIturntoAdorno'slaterworksand reconstructhisnotionsofthenegativedialecticandmimesisasrelevantcategoriesforsocialcritique,twocomplementaryconceptsthatunderscorehismodel ofautonomy.Iwillargue,however,thathisconceptionofthenegativedialectic ultimatelyleavesundertheorizeditsnormativestandingaswellasitsrelationto mimesis.Inextmovetomimesisandshowhow,onceitisproperlyunderstood,it cannotdothenormativeworkthatAdornorequiresofit.Rather,Adorno'sidea ofmimesisfailstoinformcritique(nowunderstoodasnegativethought)inany substantiveway;reliesonaproblematic,unmediatedconceptionofauthenticity; andisincompatiblewithsocialanalysesofmoderncomplexsocieties.
Adorno's idea of mimesis is distinct from Hegel's reconciliation as inclusive overcoming,butitsrelationstonegativethoughtandmediationareunclear.As such, Adorno -and many of the social theorists and aestheticians who follow him-arehardly'highmodernists', 5 regardlessoftheirclaimstosupportrational reflection,individualautonomyandthelike.WhileAdornothoughtofhimselfas arationalistwhosupersededthereductiveelementsofEnlightenmentthought, 6 histheoryprovidesanunsatisfactoryalternativetothepresentmoderncondition. Adorno'sprojectexhausteditselfnotbecauseitranintoapessimisticcul-de-sac initscritiqueofreason,asHabermasargues,butbecausetheideaofmimesiswas nevercompatiblewithmodernity. 7 RegardlessofhisintentionsAdorno'stheory of mimesis and negative thinking often seems pre-modern, and thus his social theorycannotprovideanadequateanswertothechallengesofmodernity.This, inanycase,iswhatIwillargue.
The Pathologies of Modernity
Fromitsinception,criticaltheorywasmeanttobeasupra-disciplinaryapproach toinvestigatingthenewchallengesposedbythedeclineoftherevolutionaryproletariat,theriseofmodernbureaucraticstatesandmasspolitics,andthespread ofcapitalismandreificationtoallspheresoflife.TheLukácsiandreamofrevo-lutionarypraxis-theoreticallyinformedtransformativeactioncarriedoutby'the universalclass'-disappearedwiththedevelopmentoftotalitarianismandwelfare capitalismintheindustrializedworld. Thesubstanceofitsownfreedom-oftheidentitywhichhasannexedallnon-identity-is asonewiththe'must,'withthelaw,withabsolutedominion.Thisisthesparkthatkindles thepathosofKant.Heconstruesfreedomasaspecialcaseofcausality.Tohim,itisthe 'constantlaws'thatmatter. 27 Insomerespects,thereisasimilaritybetweenAdornoandHorkheimer'sconception of critical reason and Aristotle's phronesis, or practical wisdom, which pointstowardasituatedformofreasonthatneverthelessisnotcompletelyreducibletothepressuresofcontingency. 28 However,theircriticalreasonismorethan this.
The Negative Dialectic
Asachallengetothealienationofformalreasoningandpositivistscience,Adorno andHorkheimeremphasizetheimportanceofthepresentmoment-'thesanctity of the hic et nunc'.
29 A more appropriate rationality requires sensitivity to context and the ability of the subject to make informed judgments, judgments whicharereducibleneithertopurelyinstinctualdesiresnortoappealstoatranscendental,detachedmorallaw.Indeed,intheformercasethereisnojudgment persebecausethereisnochoice-onesimplyfollowsone's(opaque)desires,like Nietzsche'sbirdsofprey.
30
Moralityrequiresagency,forotherwiseallactionis overdeterminedandresponsibilitydisappears.Thelattercaserestsonthefiction ofadivisionbetweensubjectandobject:thatis,ontherationalagentwhocan separateherselffromtheworldandassessit'accurately'and'neutrally',andthen employ a formal moral procedure to ascertain the proper course of action. A conception of rationality which demands maintenance of the distance between subjectandobjectfailstotakeintoaccountricherformsofinteractionandappreciation,intheprocessreducingeverythingoutsideofthesubjecttomerenature, tobeusedandexploited.
Acriticalrationalitytakesseriouslytheintuitivenatureofmorality WehavesomethinglikeaHegelian'reconciliation'today,Adornoargues,but it is a forced reconciliation; it is a more subtle and total domination than that foundinthepast,wheninjusticewaseasiertograspexperientiallyandconcrete resistance was still possible. 'Satanically, the world as grasped by the Hegelian systemhasonlynow,ahundredandfiftyyearslater,provedtobesuchasystem intheliteralsense,namelythatofaradicallysocietalizedsociety. ' 36 Thepresent 'reconciliation'isbasedonalogicofequivalence,whereallqualitativedifferences are reduced to quantitative functions that allow everything to be exchanged. 37 What we need is a negative dialectic, a dialectic that preserves non-identity in thoughtasthecornerstoneofresistance. 38 Thisisdifficulttoachieve,forinsofar asasubjectgraspsanobjectinthought,thesubjectidentifieswithit,atleastpartially. ' [T]heappearanceofidentityisinherentinthoughtitself,initspureform. Tothinkistoidentify.' 39 Andyetwhatiscrucialisthatthesubjectnotreifythis relation.'Dialecticsistheconsistentsenseofnon-identity.'
40 Negativedialectics, asaformofnon-identitarianthought,eschewstranscendentalidealisminfavor of immanent critique. It always springs from the present condition, and is not imposedexogenously.
Non-identitarian(ornegative)thoughtneverthelessremainsratherunderspecifiedinAdorno.SomethinkershaveturnedtoAdorno'suseofthephilosophical categoryof'concept'tospelloutthenatureofnon-identitarianthinking. 41 To understandthis,weneedtohaveasenseofwhatismeantby'concept'.Inthe mostgeneralsense,wecansaythatreasonencounterstheworldeitherthrough abstraction,orspeculativeknowledge(throughtheuseoflogicorthecalculus,for example),orthroughconcreteengagement(saythroughthestudyofactualhuman relations).Thefirstis'formal',orrelatedtopurethought,whereasthesecondis 'substantive',orrelatedtoactuality.Totheextentthatphilosophygraspstheconnectionbetweenthoughtandactuality(orform/substance,mind/matter,etc.)it hasgraspedtheunderlyingphilosophic'concept'.InHegel,aswehaveseen,the conceptrefersultimatelytoidentity,andthusreconciliation.JayBernsteinresists thisHegelianmoveandinsteadtakesseriouslyAdorno'sclaimthatphilosophy 'muststrive,bywayoftheconcept,totranscendtheconcept'. 42 Bernsteinsees thought as deploying concepts to unwrap the non-conceptual while resisting a false equivalence between the two. In this reading, concepts include a 'logical axisthroughwhichthoughtidentifiesdifferentparticulars...asbelongingtothe sameconcept'aswellas'amaterialaxiscomposedofthemediatingmomentof theobject,image,languageandtradition'. 43 Heexpertlyinvestigatestheduality of the concept itself, the way that it necessarily includes an internal residue of non-conceptualityandthuspointstoitsowntranscendence.Bernstein'scareful examinationofAdorno'suseoftheconceptgivesgreaterdepthtoAdorno'sclaim thatthenon-identicalis'thething'sownidentityagainstitsidentifications'. 44 The problem,however,isthatitremainsunclearwhatthecontentofsuchatranscendence-thatis,whatcriticalthought-actuallylookslike.Ifanethicalmomentis toemergefromnegativity,howdoweapprehendit?
Bernsteinarguesthat 
Mimesis, Utopia, and Modernity
So,negativedialecticsmayclearaspaceforcriticalthoughtandthepossibilityof emancipation.Verywell.Uptonow,Ihavedelineatedanotionofmimesisbased on the subject's transcendence of the alienation inherent in the subject-object dichotomy. Here, I want to pursue this idea of mimesis a bit further through Adorno's discussion of aesthetics, and see whether it provides the normative orientationnecessaryforcritiquetoavoidbecomingirrationalist,untethered,and possiblyreactionary.
InAesthetic Theory,Adornoarguesthattheaestheticrealmistheproperdomain formodernmimesis:'themimeticelement...isindispensabletoart',andartis 'theindigenousdomainofmimesis'. 49 ForAdorno,anauthenticworkofartresists interpretationthroughreductionto(non-aesthetic)socialcategories,andsimultaneouslyengagestheindividualthroughacomplexprocessofinterpretationand reinterpretation. Authentic artworks contain the contradictions of the broader societyinwhichtheyareembedded,buttheirmeaningisnever'given'.Conflicts overinterpretingartworksreflectthecomplexityofthecontradictionstheycontain.Atbest,wecanhaveonlyapartialunderstandingofart,atleastuntilsociety itselfcontainsnocontradictionsthatcouldbemirroredintheaestheticdomain. Intruedialecticalfashion,Adornoarguesthatwecangraspthesignificanceofart inseveralways:throughsensitivitytoart'smediationswithitself,withexisting epistemologicalcategoriesandclassificatoryschema,andwithsocietyasawhole. The most successful artworks are those that show hidden social contradictions withoutreducingthemselvestopurepropaganda,andthusbecomingsomething less than art: 'Insofar as a social function can be predicated for artworks, it is theirfunctionlessness.'
50 Inthisrespect,anartwork's'truthcontent'isnotabout whetheritdepictstheworldaccurately,asinacorrespondencetheoryoftruth, but instead concerns art's normative disclosure of a 'true' (free) future society. 'Intheworldweliveintodaytherearealwaysthingsforwhichartisandwhat istrue,betweenarrangementsforlivingandforhumanity.' 51 Thus,thepositive aspect of aesthetic truth is rooted in those autonomous artworks that resist all easyaccessibilityandinstrumentalizationinthehereandnow,thehic et nunc. 52 Throughsuchresistance,theypointtoamimeticfuturewherelifeandartwill be subsumed into one another. Mimesis, then, is the complex interpenetration andultimatelyassimilationofthesubjectwithnature,withitself,andwithfellow humanbeings.
Nevertheless,thisnotionofmimesisisproblematicforseveralreasons.Iwill make three points here: first, concerning the inadequacy of mimesis to steer critiqueintheproperdirection;second,concerningtheseeminglypre-modern intuitionismofAdorno'sideaofmimesis,whichundercutshisclaimsofmodernist theorizing;andthird,concerningtheactualcontentofmimesisanditsinadequacy forcritiquingmodernsocieties.
First,itisunclearthatmimesisprovidesanythinglikeanormativeorientation Regardless of which approach one takes, the connection between mimesis and critique remains at best tenuous. It cannot be otherwise precisely because Adorno cannot give us an argument about how awareness of mimesis emerges fromcritique.Atmost,allhecangiveusareillustrations,suchasinhisanalyses ofSchönbergandStravinsky 55 orjazz. 56 Ifanything,thesemoreconcretediscussionshighlightthesubjectivismofhisclaimsaboutmimesisandcritique,since itisunclearevenonhisowntermsthattheconclusionshereachesnecessarily followfromhisnegativedialecticalmethodorconcernformimesis,ratherthan frompersonalprejudice. 57 Critiqueandmimesisrequireasurfeitofimagination toconnectthem,aKierkegaardianleapoffaith.Andthisishardlydialectical.
Asecondissueconcernstheideaofmimesisitself.Adornooftenclaimsthat mimesis is not a reversion to a lost form of life, but can be understood in the modern condition as well, even if only imperfectly. 58 However, his mimetic authenticitydoesnotrepresenttheovercomingofdeformedmodernistrationality; if anything, it seems incompatible with the challenges of modernity and thusinadequateasasourceofcritiquefromwithinthemoderniststance.Letme explain.
Mimesis refers to the condition where humans are reconciled with nature anddonotengageitonlyforthepurposeofexploitation.
59 Furthermore,they are reconciled to themselves -they no longer repress natural drives through a deformed(instrumental)rationalityàlaOdysseus,butinsteadfindmorecomplete andsatisfyingformsofself-expressionandbeing.Andlastly,theirrelationswith othersarenotinstrumentalizedandhierarchical,butratherarebasedonequality. Butsuchamodelofutopiacannotexplainhowcomplexsocieties,characterizedby internaldifferentiationandrationality,canbeanythingbutpathological.Theidea ofmimesisasanultimategoalby definition rejectscomplexformsofmediation, formimesisisassimilation.Itisunsatisfactorytosaythatmimesisrepresentsthe transcendenceofmodernitybymovingbeyondsocialdifferentiation,thedivision oflabor,rationality,etc.,withoutindicatingwhataboutthisfutureconditionis modern (or post-modern), and not pre-modern. To speak about mimesis (and utopia) as a future condition means that it must have some connections to the (admittedlydeformed)present.Thefuturemustberootedinthepresentinsome way, unless all we seek is destruction of the present and a return to the past. Adorno 
